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SKYLAB CHECKOUT OPERATIONS

Kenneth P. Timmons
Program Director
Skylab Program
Martin Marietta Aerospace
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
The Skylab Program at Kennedy Space Center
presented many opportunities for interest
ing and profound test and checkout experi
ence. It also offered a compilation of and
challenges and promises for the Center
for the contractors responsible for the
various modules making up Skylab. It is rs
very probable that the various contracto
had common experiences during the module
and combined systems tests, but this paper
will discuss those experiences from the
viewpoint of the Multiple Docking Adapter
contractor. The experience will consider
personnel, procedures, and hardware.
PERSONNEL
Earlier programs of multiple launches
(Gemini, for example) demonstrated two
areas of concern with personnel. First the
were start-up concerns associated with
formation of the test team. New relation
ships had to be formed as the team members
learned to work together, the process of
certification and training had to be car
ried out, and the new customer and his
methods of conducting the Center's opera
tion had to be learned. These items
usually have wrinkles, but these wrinkles
can be straightened out by the time the
second vehicle is in test and the teamwork
continues to smooth out on subsequent
e
vehicles. Then later comes the inevitabl
last vehicle and with it a new set of con
and
cerns for the test team - will the men
women work full-bore, dedicated, and above
all carefully on the last article in the
face of their individual concerns over
their individual futures? On past pro
grams these last-article worries were
diminished through the application of
various motivators and panaceas - bonuses,
promises of transfers, recognition frome
the home office or plant, and assistancpro
in job hunting; these steps, plus the
fessional pride of the individuals, have
prevailed and the multiple flight programs
have gone to the wire with the last flight
as good as any - a tribute to those indi
viduals who were concerned for their fu
ture but were competent professionals
above all.

The Skylab Program at KSC didn't have or
either first-flight start-up concerns
last flight let-down concerns; Skylab had
both at one time.
The Skylab test teams were assembled
through personnel relocations from many
areas; the Workshop from Huntington Beach,
the Airlock from St. Louis, the MDA from
Denver, and the Telescope Mount from Hunts).
ville (the Apollo CSM crew was incumbent
For the MDA, as for other modules, the
start-up was assisted greatly by a diffu
sion of personnel representing two primary
experience resources. The cadre of the 
team was dominated by personnel represent
ing experience in working with KSC on
prior programs such as Gemini and the Lunar
by
Module. This cadre was later augmented
personnel with actual module design, build,
and test experience - the relocations men
tioned above. This dual reservoir of tal
ent and its diffusion formed a team opti
mized for testing one-time modules, and
the team's performance verified this ap
proach by responding quickly into cohesive
units.
PROCEDURES

Spacecraft testing at KSC is a disciplined
effort pragmatically developed. No screw
is torqued and no switch is thrown unless
in
the specific action is called out for Sheet
writing. Whether by Test Preparation
(TPS), Discrepancy Report (DR), or by Test
actions
all
and Checkout Procedure (TCP),
the
are specified in advance, reviewed by bal
NASA-Contractor counterpart check and by
the
ance system, and released for action then
function
The
KSC.
of
area
Operations
by
is performed as written and is verified
.
contractor and NASA Quality personnel mustAny
departure from the written procedure
in
be done under the control of a deviation
writing which in turn is also subject to
the counterpart check and balance controls
nce
surveilla
and the functional Quality

enforced on the original paper authoriza
tion. This discipline and control mayothers
appear slow to some, bureaucratic to was
but necessary to the experienced. Itfor the
conceived, enforced, and reinforced
Apollo Program; who can rise and criticize
the results?
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An interesting note with reference to the
development and performance of procedures
should be added at this point. Crew inter
face training is augmented at KSC during
spacecraft checkout. Therefore, the pro
cedures are developed in accordance with
the crew "checklist" which is the pro
cedure they will use while operating in
space. This accomplishes two things - it
verifies the checklist and the capability
of the astronaut to accomplish the task.
For a program consisting of "N" launches,
these controls have resulted in a learning
curve in which the first article as-run
procedures, with their deviations, were
recompiled into clearer, more efficient
procedures for the second, improved again
for the third, and the benefit of experi
enced crews and clear procedures enhanced
precise scheduling, successful testing,
and reduced effort for subsequent arti
cles. For Skylab, with "N" equal to one,
none of the learning curve benefits oc
curred. The as-run procedure, often a
six-inch stack of paper, was more pink
(deviation) than white (original TCP).
The schedule for the Skylab flow through
KSC was established and announced as a
success-oriented schedule. It was based
upon a two-shift, five-day week with the
expectation and realization that the work
would expand to fill the allotted time.
Experience had shown that a factor of 1.6
was a realistic estimate of the growth in
consumed time between the success-oriented
(green light) schedule and first-article
realism. This factor has proved to be an
optimistic approximation for Skylab. The
original posted flow schedule has been
held quite well, but only by growing the
available time by increasing to full 24hour shifts and at least six and more nor
mally seven-day weeks. Procedure diffi
culties significantly forced this growth,
but not from any single cause. There were
many: New teams were producing the pro
cedures; the hardware was being modified;
the test requirements were immature; few
as-run procedures were available; the pro
cedure release fell behind test-start
desired lead time; and, above all, no
program had ever before encompassed the
complex inter-module and inter-contractor
interfaces. The MDA, for example, looks
aft at the Airlock and McDonnell Douglas,
to the side (deployed) at the ATM and
Marshall Space Flight Center, and forward
at the Apollo CSM and Rockwell Interna
tional. Procedures had to accomplish
mated testing across these complex inter
faces (approximately 1,900 functions ver
sus 35 for the Apollo tests), and among
these interfaces only the Airlock and the
MDA had ever been mated prior to KSC test
ing. In looking back from the present
schedule status and procedural maturity,

the growth factors should surprise one
only because they were kept small. The
minimal schedule slip should not be criti
cized but should be viewed as a tribute to
good NASA management.
The actual time growth over the original
success-oriented schedule can be measured
by the test phases accomplished in the O&C
(Operations and Checkout) Building during
the latter part of 1972. Calendar days
grew from 98 to 115, work days from 66 to
102, and shifts worked increased from 175
to 299. Other measurements are available.
Examples are found in Test Change Notices
(188), Specification Changes (117), and
Deviations (2,315) against one Test Pro
cedure of 3,770 pages. The three AM/MDA
integrated tests required over 10,000
pages of basic procedures, and deviations
typically replaced half of these pages
during the conduct of the test.
Repeating, the interfaces were more com
plex than any previous spacecraft, the
teams were new, the time was short, the
requirements were immature, the hardware
was newly developed, and the test proce
dures were being released only days before
the start of testing. Even with these
hurdles to overcome, the O&C testing was
completed within two weeks of a target
date established five months earlier!
HARDWARE

The interfacing complexity of the Skylab
modules has previously been mentioned
(1,900 interface functions), but it is
difficult to portray the complexities of
the module systems, subsystems, and exper
(An example can be derived from
iments.
the data flow from one experiment, the
S192 Multiband Scanner. It fills 24 tracks
of tape of 20,000 bits per inch resolution
at 60 inches per second.) Some of the
module systems were inherited from Apollo
and had development and test maturity, but
they now had to support an eight-month
mission. Most systems were newly developed
for Skylab, and all experiments were new
developments of sophisticated equipment.
Their degree of development could best be
indicated by counting the remove-and-repair
cycles, but it can be simply stated that
all of the experiments on the MDA were
either removed and repaired or replaced or
repaired in place, plus a high percentage
of experiment support equipment. And some
more than once!
On previous programs, several techniques
were employed to verify that the facility
and GSE would be compatible with the flight
hardware. Facility verification vehicles
and separate GSE for each location were
allocated to insure trouble-free checkout.
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For most of Skylab, only one set of GSE
was allocated and it moved with the vehi
cle .
As is always the case when complicated
electronic equipment is moved, the prob
ability of creating problems is increased;
therefore, scheduled time is increased.
The converse is also true in cases when
existing facilities and hardware could be
pressed into use at KSC to help analyze
the complex experiment data. Through sim
ple changes and utilization of existing
computer facilities, tests were monitored
real time for the first time in the pro
gram. Computer programs were developed
to analyze the data and permit problems
to be promptly defined and corrected, and
this helped to offset problems associated
with the relocated GSE.
One module stood out from the rest early
in the test cycle at KSC - the Apollo
Telescope Mount. It had fewer schedule
delays, less growth in shifts worked over
planned shifts, fewer items of open paper
work (Discrepancy Reports, Deviations, and
Test Preparation Sheets) , and less equip
ment changeout. From this module T s per
formance, one should and can extract some
do-better-on-future-program ideas. For
example, Post Manufacturing Tests at
Huntsville and Thermal System Tests at
Houston were run with KSC procedures and
other KSC paperwork. By the time final
testing was done at KSC, the procedures
had been used, modified, and verified.
In addition, the thermal vacuum testing
at Houston (JSC) was unique for the Saturn
Workshop and represented additional test
time and test experience for the ATM and
its team. The ATM, therefore, benefited
from the use of as-run procedures, from
the experience of a crew which had pro
gressed through three major ATM tests plus
thermal simulation tests, and from the
maturity of the hardware as a result of
the extra tests. This programmed flow of
the test team and the early use of KSC
procedures and paperwork should be con
sidered by anyone in planning a future
program which flows through KSC.
An unrelated oddity stands out from the
above discussion. Only the unmanned mod
ule of the Saturn Workshop had its orbital
performance verified in a thermal vacuum
chamber. The manned modules, the Airlock,
the MDA and the OWS , have never had their
internal environment verified by thermal
vacuum test - only by analysis. This is
a "first" for manned space flight, and it
represents not recklessness but the recent
advancements made in thermal analysis, the
profound developments in thermal computer
programs, and the degree of faith placed
in computer models of the cluster. It is
a balance between the similitude errors of

thermal testing and the correlated accuracy
of analysis, plus the programmatic aspects
of cost and facilities required for ther
mal testing of such magnitude as would be
required for the OWS.
Some examples of uncertainties in comput
ing influencing parameters on the module
thermal systems are solar constants, albe
do constants, earth emission, internal
power, boundary temperatures, surface
absorptivity and emissivity, linear con
ductance, and view factors. Among these,
many carry over into thermal vacuum test
ing as uncertainties (the first four, for
example) and others such as the boundary
temperatures are unrealistic in a gravitydominated environment if air is used and
also if a vacuum is substituted. In the
two-gas (Skylab air) environment, attempts
to inhibit convection cause sacrifices in
radiation similitude, and convection with
in the liquid system introduces an error
into the test which has to be analyzed out
as in the two-gas inhibited convection,
impeded-radiation case.
The best justification for the rationale
for using analysis in place of complete
module thermal tests can be found in the
correlation of predicted versus measured
temperatures associated with the ATM
analysis and test. This complex space
craft yielded excellent correlation be
tween the analytical model and test re
sults.
For ATM rack-mounted components, the more
difficult analysis zone of the component
locations showed over 93% of the test
measurements agreed within 10° F of the
predicted temperatures. In a thermally
well-designed zone, the correlation was
even better with only a 5° F variation
measured in the same 93% band. These
measurements were taken over various cold,
nominal, and hot case runs, and represented
a variety of measurement locations within
the test zones.
Another measure of the prediction accuracy
of the ATM can be found in the design
changes resulting from the test results.
Only nine components were indicated by test
results to be operating outside of their
design limits. Five of these were correc
ted by additional insulation and isolation,
three had their lower qualification tem
peratures reduced, and one had a ten-watt
heater mounted to adjacent structure. None
of these changes involved a component de
sign change. This was a significant vote
of confidence for the accuracy of thermal
analysis .
In summary, the programmatic aspects of
cost did not dominate alone - the lack of
zero-g similitude in the testing compared
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to the accuracy of the developed math mod
els enabled a well justified decision to
use analysis to verify that the internal
environment of the modules will be com
fortable and safe for the crews and that
the equipment will be operated within its
design temperature band.
SUMMARY

If this paper appears to be only a com
pendium of difficulties and complexities
impeding efficient and successful testing
at KSC, then the results of these tests
to date indicate that more was done to
assist than to impede. Naturally, this
is the case, as the Skylab Program repre
sents a major accomplishment by NASA in
program integration. Through the use of
formal reviews, interface functional
simulators, interface control documents,
matched tooling, and a broad application
of good systems engineering, this complex
space station came together for the first
time at KSC with no mechanical interface
mismatches, no electrical interface mis
matches, no major systems problems, and
no serious delays. The integration
"homework" produced good hardware, the
test philosophy will assure program suc
cess, the procedural rigor at KSC assures
the fulfillment of test requirements, and
the professional pride of the participants
will assure a safe and successful mission.
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